Fairness by Omission: Rule 106 and the Doctrine of (In)completeness by Hills, Blake R.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 55 Issue 1 
Fall 2019 
Fairness by Omission: Rule 106 and the Doctrine of 
(In)completeness 
Blake R. Hills 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Blake R. Hills, Fairness by Omission: Rule 106 and the Doctrine of (In)completeness, 55 Tulsa L. Rev. 45 
(2019). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol55/iss1/15 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 26 Side A      09/18/2019   11:37:45
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 26 Side A      09/18/2019   11:37:45
C M
Y K
HILLS, B - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2019 2:03 PM 
45 
FAIRNESS BY OMISSION: RULE 106 AND THE 
DOCTRINE OF (IN)COMPLETENESS 
Blake R. Hills *
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 46?
II. DOCTRINE OF COMPLETENESS ........................................................................... 46?
III. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORP. V. RAINEY ..................................................................... 48?
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ............................................................................................... 49?
A. Rule of Admissibility ...................................................................................... 50?
1. First Circuit .............................................................................................. 50?
2. Tenth Circuit ............................................................................................ 50?
3. Eleventh Circuit ....................................................................................... 51?
4. D.C. Circuit .............................................................................................. 52?
B. Rule of Timing Only ....................................................................................... 52?
1. Fourth Circuit ........................................................................................... 53?
2. Sixth Circuit ............................................................................................. 53?
3. Eighth Circuit ........................................................................................... 54?
4. Ninth Circuit ............................................................................................ 55?
C. Discretionary Admissibility ............................................................................ 55?
1. Second Circuit .......................................................................................... 55?
2. Seventh Circuit ......................................................................................... 56?
D. Unaddressed .................................................................................................... 57?
1. Third Circuit ............................................................................................. 57?
2. Fifth Circuit .............................................................................................. 58?
V. FAIRNESS AND RELIABILITY ............................................................................... 58?
A. Fairness ........................................................................................................... 59?
B. Reliability ........................................................................................................ 60?
C. Limited Admissibility ..................................................................................... 61?
VI. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 62?
                                                          
*Prosecuting Attorney, Summit County Utah Attorney?s Office. J.D., S.J. Quinney University of Utah College 
of Law (1998). The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Summit County Attorney?s Office. 
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 26 Side B      09/18/2019   11:37:45
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 26 Side B      09/18/2019   11:37:45
C M
Y K
HILLS, B - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2019 2:03 PM 
46 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:45 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider a scenario in which a defendant is charged with distributing large quantities 
of narcotics. After he was arrested and waived his right to remain silent and be represented 
by counsel,1 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ???????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????tective testifies that 
the defendant admitted to distributing methamphetamine on multiple occasions.2
Unsurprisingly, the prosecutor does not elicit testimony about the second statement 
involving communist spies. During cross-examination, the defense seeks to introduce the 
statement about communists in order to further a possible compulsion defense, but the 
prosecutor objects that the statement is hearsay.3 How should the court rule? 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????tation of 
Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,4 which provides, ????f a party introduces all or 
part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at 
that time, of any other part?or any other writing or recorded statement?that in fairness 
?????????????????????????????????????????5 ??????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
chance in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey 6 has led to a significant split between the circuit 
courts. The resulting system in which the interpretation of Rule 106 depends on location 
is untenable in a modern age when crimes and investigations frequently cross jurisdictional 
boundaries. Both defendants and prosecutors are entitled to consistent rules for this issue 
that is likely to be present in every case in which a defendant has made an inculpatory 
statement. Thus, the Supreme Court should provide consistency for the interpretation of 
Rule 106. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II examines the background of the doctrine 
of completeness. Part III examines the Rainey decision, with discussion on what the 
Supreme Court failed to address about Rule 106. Part IV surveys the split of authority in 
the case law. Part V provides a suggestion of how the Supreme Court should answer the 
questions it failed to answer in Rainey in order to provide clear guidelines for Rule 106 
analysis. 
II. DOCTRINE OF COMPLETENESS 
The doctrine of completeness existed in the common law at least as far back as the 
early 1600s.7 At its most basic, this doctrine can be stated as follows: ????? ??????????
against whom a part of an utterance has been put in, may in his turn complement it by 
                                                          
1. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that appropriate procedural safeguards are to 
be used to protect a suspect?s right against self-incrimination and to inform the suspect about the right to counsel). 
 2. Confessions by defendants are routinely introduced against them at trial. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) 
(providing that statements of an opposing party are admissible as non-hearsay when offered against that party). 
3. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2) (providing that hearsay is an out of court statement offered to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted); FED. R. EVID. 802 (providing that hearsay is generally not admissible). 
 4. Or the equivalent state Rule 106 for state prosecutions. 
 5. FED. R. EVID. 106. 
 6. 488 U.S. 153 (1988). 
 7. 7 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 601 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). 
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2019] FAIRNESS BY OMISSION 47 
putting in the remainder, in order to secure for the tribunal a complete understanding of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????8 Under this doctrine, the opponent was allowed 
to put in the remainder of the utterance because: 
the thought as a whole, and as it actually existed, cannot be ascertained without taking the 
utterance as a whole and comparing the successive elements and their mutual relations. To 
look at a part alone would be to obtain a false notion of the thought. The total?that is to say, 
the real?meaning can be got at only by going on to the end of the utterance. One part cannot 
be separated and taken by itself without doing injustice, by [producing] misrepresentation.9
Significantly, the doctrine had a trumping function that allowed for introduction of the 
remainder even though it would otherwise be inadmissible under rules of exclusion such 
as hearsay.10
However, this doctrine did not allow the opponent unfettered license to introduce 
any and all remainders. Indeed, there were two requirements for the introduction of a 
remainder. Fi??????No utterance irrelevant to the issue is receivable.?11 ?????????No more 
of the remainder of the utterance than concerns the same subject, and is explanatory of 
the first part, ???????????????12 As a further limitation, the remainder was not considered to 
be evidence itself, but was only an aid to help in the understanding of the utterance as a 
whole.13
Rule 106 was adopted in 1975 and was amended in 1987 and 2011.14 As originally 
proposed, the rule would have stated: 
When a writing, statement, or conversation, or part thereof, is introduced by a party, an 
adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part or related writing, 
statement, or conversation relevant to that introduced. Nothing herein precludes any party 
from introducing on his own motion any other relevant part or related writing, statement, or 
conversation.15
Essentially, the proposed rule would have kept the common law doctrine but sped up the 
process of completing the statement. 
The final draft departed from the common law doctrine by eliminating its application 
???????? ?????????????????? ??????????????????????? ?????????? ??????????????????? ?????????
statement or part thereof, is introduced by a party, he may be required at that time to 
introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness 
??????????????????????????16
???????? ???? ????????? ?????????? ??????????? ???? ?????? ????? ???? ????????? ?????
                                                          
8. Id. at 653. This doctrine applied to both oral and written statements. Id. at 595 n.1. 
9. Id. at 595. 
10. See Dale A. Nance, Verbal Completeness and Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
75 TEX. L. REV. 51, 54 (1996). 
 11. WIGMORE, supra note 7, at 656. 
12. Id. This restriction existed ?so that the opponent shall not, under cloak of this conceded right, put in 
utterances which do not come within its principle and would be otherwise inadmissible.? Id. 
13. Id. at 656, 659. 
14. See FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee?s notes to 1987 and 2011 amendments. 
 15. 21A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
§ 5071 (2d ed. 2018).
16. Id.
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48 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:45 
?????????????????????????17 ???? ????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
???????????????? the advisory committee rejected this proposal.18 The advisory committee 
????????? ????? ????????? ?????? ??? ??? ???????????? ????? ????? ??????????? ????????? ???????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????19 However, when the Department of 
Justice subsequently made this same request when the proposed rule was before the Senate 
??????????????????? ??????????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ???????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????20
The version of the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require 
him at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement 
which ought ??? ????????? ??? ??? ??????????? ?????????????????? ????? ????21 The advisory 
committee note remained silent as to whether a remainder had to be otherwise admissible 
in order to be introduced under this rule. The 1987 amendment simply removed gendered 
pronouns from the rule and the 2011 amendment was only stylistic.22 The advisory 
committee notes continued to remain silent on whether inadmissible evidence could be 
used for completeness. 
III. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORP. V. RAINEY
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey was a product liability case that was filed after a 
Navy flight instructor and her student were killed when the aircraft lost altitude and 
crashed.23 Because there were no survivors and the aircraft was severely damaged, the 
cause of the crash could not be determined with exactness.24 The plaintiffs alleged that the 
crash was caused by an equipment malfunction, while the defendants claimed that pilot 
error was the cause.25 This was the only seriously disputed question at trial.26
One of the plaintiffs was John Rainey, a Navy flight instructor who was the husband 
of the deceased pilot.27 A few months after the crash, Rainey wrote a letter in which he 
took issue with an investigative report and outlined his own theory that the crash was 
caused by equipment malfunction.28 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
but was called as a witness by the defense.29 During direct examination, the defense asked 
Rainey about statements in the letter that tended to suggest that pilot error was the cause 
of the crash, and he admitted making the statements.30 During cross-examination, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
17. Id. (citation omitted). 
18. Id. at § 5078.1. 
19. Id.
20. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 5078.1. 
21. Id. § 5071. 
22. See FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee?s notes to 1987 and 2011 amendments. 
 23. 488 U.S. 153, 156 (1988). 
24. Id.
25. Id. at 156?57. 
26. Id. at 157. 
27. Id. at 159. 
28. Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 159. 
29. Id.
30. Id. at 159?60. 
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2019] FAIRNESS BY OMISSION 49 
of the crash was equipment malfunction.31 Before Rainey could answer, the judge 
sustained a defense objection and further questioning along that line was cut off.32
The jury found in favor of the defendants, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed.33 The 
court held that under Rule 106, it was reversible error to prohibit cross-examination about 
???? ?????? ??? ????????? ??????? ????? ?????? ????? ???? ???? ??????????? ??? ????? ??? ??????? ???
context.34
The Supreme Court began its analysis of this issue by noting that Rule 106 had 
??????????? ????????? ???? ????????? ??? ??????????????35 Unfortunately, the Court did not 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
scope and meaning of Rule 106??36 Instead, the Court held that Rainey should have been 
allowed to testify about the portion of his letter attributing the crash to equipment 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
misunderstanding or distortion can be averted only through presentation of another 
portion, the material required for completeness is ipso facto relevant and therefore 
????????????????????????????????????37
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Court 
essentially admitted that the principle supporting Rule 106 was directly applicable to the 
case. It may be that the Court felt that because Rainey actually testified on direct and was 
asked about the letter containing his opinion, he should have been able to testify on cross-
examination about his entire opinion directly, rather than using Rule 106 to get his opinion 
??????? ???? ?????? ??????????? ??? ???? ???????? ???????? ???? ???????? ??? ???????? ????? ???? ????
resulted in a system in which the meaning and scope of the rule depend on where the court 
addressing the issue is located. 
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
It is not surprising that, left to their own interpretations, the circuit courts have taken 
a variety of positions on the scope and meaning of Rule 106. Indeed, the decisions of the 
circuit courts are far from uniform on whether Rule 106 has a trumping function that 
allows for remainders that are otherwise inadmissible or is a rule that controls only the 
timing of introduction.38
                                                          
31. Id. at 160. 
32. Id.
33. Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 160. 
34. Id. at 160?61. 
35. Id. at 172. 
36. Id.
37. Id.
 38. By its express terms, Rule 106 does not apply to oral statements that are not recorded. However, many 
courts have held that the principles and guidelines of Rule 106 apply to oral statements pursuant to Rule 611, 
which states: ?[t]he court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses 
and presenting evidence so as to: make those procedures effective for determining the truth . . . ?? FED R. EVID.
611(a)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Pacquette, 557 F. App?x 933, 936 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that the principles 
of Rule 106 apply to oral statements under Rule 611); United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 734 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (stating that the doctrine of completeness in Rule 106 is applicable to oral statements by virtue of Rule 
611); United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 576 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that the principles of Rule 106 apply to 
oral statements under Rule 611). 
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50 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:45 
A. Rule of Admissibility 
One interpretation is to treat Rule 106 as a rule of admissibility that allows for the 
introduction of otherwise inadmissible remainders. The First, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. 
Circuits take this position. 
1. First Circuit 
The First Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States v. 
Bucci, in which the defendant had been convicted of various drug and firearm offenses 
that occurred as part of a plan to rob a drug dealer.39 At trial, the prosecution introduced 
redacted portions of a recorded conversation between the drug dealer and a cooperating 
witness who both testified at trial.40 The defendant moved under Rule 106 to have the 
prosecution introduce other portions of the redacted recording, but the trial court denied 
the motion.41 The defendant argued on appeal that the remainder of the recording should 
have been admitted at the same time because it undermined the credibility of the witnesses 
and because the redacted excerpts were fragmented and confusing.42 The defendant 
conceded that the remainder would be inadmissible hearsay if he had independently 
offered it for admission into evidence.43
The First Circuit began its analysis by stating that its position was that Rule 106 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????44 The court then stated that i?????????
law unambiguously establishes that the rule of completeness may be invoked to facilitate 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????45 However, the court ruled that the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????defendant because his 
attorney was able to use the remainder to essentially destroy the credibility of the witnesses 
on cross-examination and because the prosecution itself clarified any misapprehension that 
resulted from the recording being redacted.46 In essence, the court found that there was no 
prejudice because the content of the remainder was disclosed to the jury. 
2. Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States v. 
Lopez-Medina, in which the defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine 
with intent to distribute.47 During trial, the defense introduced the fact that a co-defendant 
had already pled guilty to the crimes that defendant was charged with in order to support 
an argument that the guilty party had already been convicted and the defendant was just 
                                                          
 39. 525 F.3d 116, 120?21 (1st Cir. 2008). 




44. Bucci, 525 F.3d at 133. 
45. Id. (citing United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Awon, 135 F.3d 
96, 101 (1st Cir. 1998)). The court recognized that ?[o]ther circuits have held differently,? but stated that it would 
?adhere to [its] own precedent.? Id.
46. Id. at 134. 
 47. 596 F.3d 716, 722 (10th Cir. 2010). 
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2019] FAIRNESS BY OMISSION 51 
an innocent bystander.48 The prosecution was then allowed to introduce that factual basis 
that was included in the co-???????????? ????? ??????????? ????????????? ???? ??-????????????
statement that he had aided and abetted the defendant in jointly possessing 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute.49 The defendant argued on appeal that his right 
to confrontation was violated when the court admitted the co-???????????? ????????
allocution.50
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the co-???????????? ????????
allocution would have been inadmissible if the prosecution had attempted to introduce it 
by itself.51 However, the court held that the evidence was properly introduced under Rule 
???? ???????? ?? the fact allocution would [have] be[en] subject to a hearsay objection 
. . . ??52 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
jury by allowing into the record relevant portions of a writing or recorded statement which 
??????????????????????????????????????????????53
The Tenth Circuit then held that evidence must satisfy a four-part test in order to be 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
explains the admitted evidence, (2) places the admitted evidence in context, (3) avoids 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????54
The court held that the factual basis in the co-???????????? ??????????? ?????????? ????? ?????
because it placed the co-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
into believing that the co-defendant had accepted sole responsibility for possessing the 
methamphetamine himself.55
3. Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States 
v. Baker, in which eleven defendants were convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.56
At trial, the prosecution had a detective testify about inculpatory statements that one 
defendant made when questioned after arrest.57 The defendant sought to question the 
detective about the exculpatory portions of his post-arrest statements, but the trial court 
denied his motion to do so.58
The Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court had erred.59 The court stated that under 
Rule 106??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
48. Id. at 724. 
49. Id. at 725. 
50. Id. at 733. 
51. Id. at 730?31. 
52. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d at 735; see also, United States v. Lemon, 714 F. App?x 851, 860 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(stating that Rule 106 allows inadmissible hearsay evidence if otherwise appropriate). 
53. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d at 735 (quoting United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 481 (4th Cir. 2004)). 
54. Id. (quoting United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
55. Id.
 56. 432 F.3d 1189, 1199?1200 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813 (2006). 
57. Id. at 1222. 
58. Id.
59. Id.
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 29 Side B      09/18/2019   11:37:45
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 29 Side B      09/18/2019   11:37:45
C M
Y K
HILLS, B - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2019 2:03 PM 
52 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:45 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????60
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
was necessary to clarify the other statements he made to the detective, he should have been 
allowed to introduce the remainder.61
4. D.C. Circuit 
The D.C. Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States v. 
Sutton, in which two defendants were convicted of various conspiracy and bribery 
charges.62 During the trial, the prosecution had introduced portions of taped conversations 
between one of the defend??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
consciousness of guilt.63 The defendant attempted to introduce other exculpatory portions 




????????65 Because Rule 106 does not contain this language, the court concluded that it 
should not be construed in a restrictive manner.66 Thus, the court held: 
Rule 106 can adequately fulfill its function only by permitting the admission of some 
otherwise inadmissible evidence when the court finds in fairness that the proffered evidence 
should be considered contemporaneously. A contrary construction raises the specter of 
distorted and misleading trials, and creates difficulties for both litigants and the trial court.67
The court held that under Rule 106, the prosecution should be allowed to introduce 
inculpatory statements and the defense can then argue that the statements are misleading 
because they are presented out of context.68 ???? ?????? ?????? ????????????? ?????? ????????
portions to be contemporaneously introduced as will remove the distortion that otherwise 
????????????????????????????????????????????69
The court then examined the disputed statements. Because the remainder of the 
??????????? ????????? ?????????????????? ?????? ????? ?????????? ??????????? ?????????? ????? ????
defendant had the required guilty mental state, the court held that the defendant should 
have been allowed to enter the remainder into evidence.70
B. Rule of Timing Only 
Another interpretation treats Rule 106 as only a rule of timing that does not allow 
                                                          
60. Id.
61. Baker, 432 F.3d at 1222; see also, United States v. Pacquette, 557 F. App?x 933, 936?37 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that Rule 106 applies to exculpatory statements). 
 62. 801 F.2d 1346, 1348?49 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
63. Id. at 1366?67. 
64. Id. at 1367. 
65. Id. at 1368 (quoting WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 5078). 
66. Id.
67. Sutton, 801 F.2d at 1369. 
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1370. 
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2019] FAIRNESS BY OMISSION 53 
for the introduction of otherwise inadmissible remainders. The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits take this position. 
1. Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States v. 
Hassan, in which three defendants were convicted of offenses related to terrorism.71 At 
trial, the prosecution presented a training video posted on the internet that one of the 
defendants made in which the defendant made several statements that could be interpreted 
as calling for a violent jihad.72 The defendant then sought to introduce postings he made 
in response to critical comments from other users of the internet site.73 Specifically, the 
defendant sought to introduce a specific post in which he claimed that he did not support 
terrorists.74
The Fourth Circuit ????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
?relevant portions of otherwise excluded testimony which clarify or explain the part 
already received,? in order to ?prevent a party from misleading the jury? by failing to 
introduce the ???????????????????????????????????????75 However, the court stated that Rule 
?????????????????????????????????. . . evidence which is otherwise inadmissible under the 
????????????????76 ????????????????????????????????????????????????-serving, exculpatory 
s???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????77
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
because they were inadmissible hearsay.78
2. Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States v. 
Shaver, in which the defendant was convicted of mail fraud.79 During an interview with a 
postal inspector, the defendant admitted to acts that constituted elements of the offense.80
However, the defendant also claimed that he had acted innocently and had only followed 
????????????? ?????????????81 ??????????? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ?????? ?????? ????????????????
admissions, but the trial court refused to allow cross-??????????????????????????????????
exculpatory statements.82 The defendant argued on appeal that he should have been able 
to introduce his exculpatory statements under the doctrine of completeness.83
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by stating that, as codified, Rule 106 merely 
                                                          
 71. 742 F.3d 104, 110 (4th Cir. 2014). 
72. Id. at 134. 
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting United States v. Bellin, 264 F.3d 391, 414 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
76. Hassan, 742 F.3d at 134 (quoting United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 526 (4th Cir. 2008)).  
77. Id. (quoting Lentz, 524 F.3d at 526).
78. Id.




83. Id. at 532. 
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controls the order i?? ?????? ????????? ??? ??????????? ???? ????? ???? ?????? ?????????????
????????? ????????????84 ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ??????????????? ?? ??????-law doctrine, 
????? ???? ????????? ???? ???????? ??????? ???????? ??????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ??????? ???
provided by these rules or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to 
?????????? ???????????? ???????????? ???????? ???? ???? ????? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ?????? ???
??????????????85 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
hearsay, the court held that it was properly excluded.86
3. Eighth Circuit 
The Eighth Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States v. 
Ramos-Caraballo, in which the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine.87 During the trial, the defense attorney attempted to impeach an officer 
during cross-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
testimony, suppression hearing testimony, and police report.88 The prosecution then 
moved, and was allowed, to introduce the complete grand jury testimony, the complete 
testimony at the suppression hearing, and the complete police report under Rule 106.89
The defendant argued on appeal that this was erroneous.90
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by stating that under Rule 1???? ????? ??????
urging admission of an excluded conversation must specify the portion of the testimony 
that is relevant to the issue at trial and that qualifies or explains portions already 
??????????91 The court then stated that: 
?Rule 106, the rule of completeness, which is limited to writings,? does not ?empower a 
court to admit unrelated hearsay in the interest of fairness and completeness when that 
hearsay does not come within a defined hearsay exception.? Furthermore, the rule does not 
come into play when ?a few inconsistencies between out-of-court and in-court statements 
are revealed through cross-examination; rather, it operates to ensure fairness where a 
misunderstanding or distortion created by the other party can only be averted by the 
introduction of the full text of the out-of-court statement.?92
The court determined that rather than trying to clear up a misunderstanding that 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the prosecution was actually attempting to improperly bolster its witness.93 Because Rule 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
cross-examination; it is not proper to admit all prior consistent statements simply to bolster 
                                                          
84. Shaver, 89 F. App?x at 532. 
85. Id. at 533 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 802). 
86. Id. at 535; see also United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 826 (6th Cir. 2013) (stating that ?[e]xculpatory 
hearsay may not come in solely on the basis of completeness?) (quoting Shaver, at 526). 
 87. 375 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2004) 
88. Id. at 802. 
89. Id. at 801. There were some redactions that were agreed upon.
90. Id. at 802. 
91. Id. at 803 (quoting United States v. King, 351 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2013)). 
92. Ramos-Caraballo, 375 F.3d at 803 (internal citations and alterations omitted). 
93. Id.
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the credibility of a ???????? ??????????????????????????????????????94 Thus, the court held 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????95
4. Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States v. 
Collicott, in which the defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute.96 At trial, the prosecution called a witness who was present during 
a drug transaction conducted by the defendant.97 The defense asked the witness about 
statements she made to a police officer, but she stated that she could not remember making 
the statements.98 The prosecution then called the police officer and was allowed, over 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????99 The defendant 
argued at trial and on appeal that this constituted the improper admission of hearsay 
evidence.100
?????????? ???????? ?????? ???? ????????? ??? ???????? ????? ???? ????????? ?????????? ????
hearsay.101 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? the evidence was 
????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????102 The court 
??????????????????????????? ???????????-of-court statements to the officer did not fall within 
any exception to the hearsay rule, they were inadmissible regardless of Rule 106 and the 
trial court erred by allowing them to be introduced into evidence.103
C. Discretionary Admissibility 
A minority of circuits view Rule 106 as a rule of admissibility that provides a court 
with discretion to allow the introduction of otherwise inadmissible remainders if necessary 
for the ascertainment of truth. The Second and Seventh Circuits take this approach. 
1. Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States 
v. Gonzalez, in which two defendants were convicted of various drug and conspiracy 
crimes.104 At trial, the government introduced the statement of defendant number one that 
a murder victim had robbed drug dealers in order to prove that the murder was tied to the 
drug conspiracy involving the defendants.105 Both defendants argued on appeal that the 
                                                          
94. Id. (quoting United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2001). 
95. Id.
 96. 92 F.3d 973, 975 (9th Cir. 1996). 
97. Id. at 976. 
98. Id.
99. Id. at 976?77. 
100. Id. at 978. 
101. Collicott, 92 F.3d at 978?84. 
102. Id. at 983 (quoting Phoenix Associates III v. Stone, 60 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
103. Id.; see also, United States v. Meraz, 663 F. App?x 580, 581 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that Rule 106 ?does 
not compel admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence?) (quoting Collicott, 92 F.3d at 983). 
 104. 399 F. App?x 641, 644 (2d Cir. 2010). 
105. Id. at 645. 
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
106.106 Spe??????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
two had tried to keep him out of the drug business in order to protect him.107
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to introduce the remainder of a statement not otherwise admissible if it is ?necessary to 
explain the admitted portion, to place the admitted portion in context, to avoid misleading 
the jury, or to ensure fair and impartial understanding of the admitted portion.??108
?????????????? ???? ?????? ???? ?require introduction of portions of a statement that are 
neither explanatory of nor relevant to the admitted passages.??109 Thus, it is within the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????sary for 
completeness or should be excluded to prevent an opponent bypassing hearsay rules to 
introduce self-serving evidence.110
The Second Circuit then held that the remainder of the statement was properly 
?????????????????????????????????????-serving statement that defendant one had attempted 
to minimize his role in the conspiracy did nothing to clarify or explain the statement that 
the murder victim robbed drug dealers.111 In so holding, the court reinforced its prior 
decision that when determining whether a remainder should be admitted pursuant to Rule 
????? ????? ???????????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ???? ?????? ???????? ??????????????? [is] to exercise 
common sense and a sense of fairness to protect the rights of the parties while remaining 
????? ????????????????????s obligation to protect the interest of society in the ?ascertainment 
of the truth.??112
2. Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit addressed the scope and meaning of Rule 106 in United States 
v. LeFevour, in which a former state court judge was convicted of racketeering, mail fraud, 
and filing false income tax returns.113 At trial, the prosecution played a taped conversation 
between the defendant and a police officer to show that the defendant knew who the 
????????????????? ???114 The prosecution did not play a subsequent portion of the recording 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????? ??????????????????115 The defense moved to admit this part of the taped 
conversation, but the trial court ruled that it was irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible.116 The 
defendant argued on appeal that the remainder of the tape should have been admitted 
pursuant to Rule 106.117
                                                          
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571,576 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
109. Gonzalez, 399 F. App?x 645 (quoting United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 576 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 611(a)). 
 113. 798 F.2d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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The Seventh Circuit noted that the trial court had implicitly treated Rule 106 as only 
a rule of tim????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????118
The court stated that the rule is: 
If otherwise inadmissible evidence is necessary to correct a misleading impression, then 
either it is admissible for this limited purpose by force of Rule 106 . . . or, if it is inadmissible 
(maybe because of privilege), the misleading evidence must be excluded too. The party 
against whom that evidence is offered can hardly care which route is taken, provided he 
honestly wanted the otherwise inadmissible evidence admitted only for the purpose of 
pulling the sting from evidence his opponent wanted to use against him. Rule 106 was not 
intended to override every privilege and other exclusionary rule of evidence in the legal 
armamentarium, so there must be cases where if an excerpt is misleading the only cure is to 
exclude it rather than to put in other excerpts.119
????? ????????? ??????????? ?? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ??? ???????????? ????????
otherwise inadmissible evidence should be admitted or whether the misleading portion of 
a statement should be excluded entirely. Ultimately, the court ruled that the remainder of 
the tape was not admissible, not because it was hearsay, but because the original portion 
of the tape was a complete statement that was not misleading.120
D. Unaddressed 
The Third and Fifth Circuits have not addressed whether Rule 106 allows for the 
admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence or is a rule of timing only. 
1. Third Circuit 
?????????????????????? ??????????? ???? ???????????????????? ?????????????? ???United 
States v. Hoffecker.121 In that case, the defendant was convicted of various wire fraud and 
mail fraud charges after the prosecution played a portion of his recorded statement.122 The 
defendant argued that the entire tape should have been admitted into evidence under Rule 
106 because it was necessary to rebut his statements in another recording and to rebut other 
unrecorded statements to witnesses.123
The Third Circuit stated that under Rule 106, additional portions of a recording may 
?????????????? ??? ????????????? ??? ???????????? ?????????????????????? ?????????? ?????????????
portion in context, (3) avoid misleading the trier of fact, or (4) insure a fair and impartial 
???????????????124 H???????? ????he Rule does not require introduction of portions of a 
statement that are neither explanatory of nor relevant to the passages that have been 
??????????125 The court did not address whether Rule 106 would allow for the introduction 
                                                          
118. LeFevour, 798 F.2d at 981. 
119. Id.; see also United States v. Reese, 666 F.3d 1007, 1019 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing LeFevour for the 
proposition that ?otherwise inadmissible evidence may be admissible under Rule 106 to correct a misleading 
impression or else the misleading evidence must be excluded?). 
120. LeFevour, 798 F.2d at 981?82. 
 121. 530 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2008). 
122. Id. at 145, 192. 
123. Id. at 192. 
124. Id. (quoting United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
125. Id. (quoting Soures, 736 F.2d at 91).
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of evidence that was otherwise inadmissible. This discussion was unnecessary because the 
defendant had failed to show that introduction of the entire tape was necessary to explain 
or place his entirely separate statements in context.126
2. Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit w??? ??????????? ???? ?????? ???????? ?????? ?????????????? ???United 
States v. Branch, in which six defendants were convicted of various crimes that arose out 
of a firefight that erupted when ATF agents attempted to execute a search and arrest 
warrant.127 At trial, the prosecution introduced a portion of an interview that one of the 
defendants gave to a law enforcement officer.128 The government filed a preemptive 
motion to prevent the defendant from introducing the other exculpatory portions of the 
interview into evidence, and the trial court granted the motion to a large degree.129
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
permit the contemporaneous introduction of recorded statements that place in context other 
writings admitt?????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ???????????130 In addition, 
???? ?????? ??????? ????? ???? ??????????? ????????? ???????? ???? ????????? ???? ?????????? ??? ???
?????????? ??? ???? ????????? ???? ?necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the 
portion already introduced.??131 The court did not address whether Rule 106 allows for 
the introduction of evidence that is otherwise inadmissible. It was unnecessary for the court 
to address this issue because the defendant had failed to show how the excluded remainder 
of his statement qualified, explained, or placed the admitted portions into context.132
??????????????????????????????????? ????????? ??? ???? ???????????????????????????-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? . . requires the 
admission of the entire statement once any portion is admitted in a criminal 
?????????????133 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
constitutional rights by applying Rule 106 as written and requiring that a defendant 
demonstrate with particularity the unfairness in the selective admission of his post-arrest 
???????????134
V. FAIRNESS AND RELIABILITY 
The failure of the Supreme Court in Rainey to establish clear guidelines for the Rule 
106 analysis has led to a confused mixture of rules that depend on where a trial occurs. 
This situation is untenable in a modern age when crimes frequently cross jurisdictional 
                                                          
126. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 137. 
 127. 91 F.3d 699, 709 (5th Cir. 1996). 
128. Id. at 725. 
129. Id. at 726. 
130. Id. at 727 (quoting United States v. Jamar, 561 F.2d 1103, 1108 (4th Cir. 1977)).  
131. Id. at 727. 
132. Branch, 91 F.3d at 728?29; see also, United States v. Flores, 293 F. App?x 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(stating that Rule 106 only allows the admission of a remainder of a statement that is relevant and necessary to 
qualify, explain, or place into context the portion already introduced but failing to address whether the rule allows 
for the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence). 
133. Branch, 91 F.3d at 729 (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 5077). 
134. Id. (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 5077). 
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2019] FAIRNESS BY OMISSION 59 
boundaries. Both defendants and prosecutors are entitled to consistent rules. The time has 
come for the Supreme Court to establish clear guidelines based on the principles of 
fairness, reliability, and limited admissibility. 
A. Fairness 
Rule 106 allows an opponent to require the introduction of the remainder of a 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????135 Does this vague 
notion of fairness mean that Rule 106 allows for the introduction of a remainder that is 
otherwise inadmissible? The Supreme Court should rule that it does, if the remainder 
satisfies requirements of relevance and reliability. 
In determining whether otherwise inadmissible evidence can ever be introduced 
under Rule 106, it is essential to look at Rule 102 for the principles that guide interpretation 
of the rules. Rule 102 states, ????????????????????????????????????????????administer every 
proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????136
The key principles that should guide the interpretation of ????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????137 These principles can only be honored 
if statements are presented in a way that allows a jury to understand their true meaning. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????andards [in Rule 102] would be met by 
a construction that would allow a party to present evidence out of context so as to mislead 
the jury, then assert an exclusionary rule to keep the other side from exposing his 
???????????138
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the meaning and scope of Rule 106, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Court has held that, although the government cannot introduce the statement of a defendant 
in its case in chief when the statement was taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????139 The 
Court stated: 
If a defendant exercises his right to testify on his own behalf, he assumes a reciprocal 
obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and we have consistently rejected arguments 
that would allow a defendant to turn the illegal method by which evidence in the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
shield against contradiction of his untruths.140
????? ?????? ????? ???? ?????? ?????????? ?? ??????? ???????? ??? ??? ???? ??? ?????? ??????????
                                                          
 135. FED. R. EVID. 106. 
 136. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 137. Harold F. Baker, Completing the Rule of Completeness: Amending Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 281, 290 (2018). 
 138. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 5078.1. 
 139. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351 (1980). 
140. Id. (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971)) (internal citation omitted); see also Kansas 
v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 593 (2009) (stating that ?it is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an 
affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can . . . provide 
himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.?) (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 
(1954)). 
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inadmissible evidence can be used to correct a misrepresentation by a party. 
However, this does not mean that Rule 106 creates a free-for-all in which an 
????????????? ????????????????????????????? ??????????? ??????????????????????? ????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
an opponent required to mud wrestle a dirty proponent but only in the ??????????????????
???????? ????? ??????? ???????? ??????????? ?????????????141 Fairness is the opportunity to 
correct a misleading impression of a statement, not the opportunity to introduce evidence 
at will. Thus, the remainder of the statement must be relevant to correcting the misleading 
impression. 
The best method for determining whether a remainder is relevant to correcting a 
misrepresentation under Rule 106 is the four-part test of United States v. Lopez-Medina:
????? ??? ????????? ?????????ted evidence, (2) places the admitted evidence in context, (3) 
avoids misleading the jury, and (4) insures fair and impartial understanding of the 
??????????142 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
explanatory of the por????? ????? ??? ??????????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ???????????? ??????? ??? ????
??????143
B. Reliability 
????????? ???? ????????????? ????????????? ?????????? ?????? ????????? ?????????????????
Rule 106, it must also have some indicia of reliability. Allowing an unreliable remainder 
to be introduced in an alleged attempt to correct a misunderstanding does not serve the end 
of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination. 
Most of the time, a remainder of a statement is otherwise inadmissible because it is 
hearsay. Hearsay generally lacks a sufficient indicia of reliability to be admissible.144 This 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
self-serving exculpatory statements, without testifying, under the guise of 
completeness??145 ??????????????????????????????????????-serving exculpatory statements, 
without a guarantee of trustworthiness as prescribed by the rules of evidence, would 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????146
Although it was not in the context of Rule 106, the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
the problem inherent in admitting exculpatory remainders. In Williamson v. United States,
the Court was confronted with the question of whether the exception to the hearsay rule 
for statements against penal interest allows for only inculpatory statements, or also allows 
for the remainder that is not inculpatory.147 The Court held that this exception only allows 
                                                          
 141. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 5072.1. 
 142. 596 F.3d 716, 735 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Zamudio, 1998 WL 1666000, at *6 (10th 
Cir. Apr. 6, 1998)). 
 143. Michael A. Hardin, This Space Intentionally Left Blank: What to do When Hearsay and Rule 106 
Completeness Collide, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1283, 1304 (2013). 
144. See Baker, supra note 137, at 295 (noting that the rule against hearsay ?strives to make inadmissible any 
evidence lacking adequate indicia of reliability?). 
145. Id. at 298. 
146. Id.
 147. 512 U.S. 594 (1994). 
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2019] FAIRNESS BY OMISSION 61 
inculpatory statements.148 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
notion that reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend 
not to make self-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????149 However, 
This notion sim??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
person is making a broadly self-inculpatory confession does not make more credible the 
????????????? ???-self-inculpatory parts. One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix 
falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-
inculpatory nature. . . . Self-exculpatory statements are exactly the ones which people are 
most likely to make even when they are false; and mere proximity to other, self-inculpatory, 
statements does not increase the plausibility of the self-exculpatory statements.150
This commonsense notion is directly applicable to the Rule 106 analysis. Self-serving 
exculpatory remainders should be viewed with caution, and the trial court should only 
allow them to be introduced if there is an indicia of reliability. 
C. Limited Admissibility 
The fear about remainders that are otherwise inadmissible should be alleviated by 
an interpretation that allows them to be introduced for the limited purpose of providing 
context to correct a misunderstanding, and not as substantive evidence. Indeed, this was 
??????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????ed version, not to refute other evidence of 
???????151
Limited admissibility is a part of the rules of evidence.152 For example, Rule 404(b) 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance 
????? ???????????????153 ????????????????????????????????????????for another purpose, 
such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake, or la????????????????154 Similarly under Rule 412, evidence may not 
??? ????????? ??? ?????? ????? ??? ??????? ???????? ??? ?????? ??????? ?????????? ??? ??? ??????? ??
?????????????????????????????155 However, evidence of sexual behavior may be admitted to 
???????????????????????er than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other 
?????????????????????????????????????????156 ??????????????????????????????????????????????
admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for a purpose?but not against another 
party or for another purpose?the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its 
????????????????????????????????????????????????157
                                                          
148. Id. at 600?01. 
149. Id. at 599. 
150. Id. at 599?600 (emphasis added). 
 151. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 5072 n.21. 
152. See Hardin, supra note 143, at 1287 (stating that ?many of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit the use 
of evidence for one or more particular purposes but allow it for any other purpose?). 
 153. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). 
 154. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
 155. FED. R. EVID. 412(a). 
 156. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1). 
 157. FED. R. EVID. 105. 
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The decision of the Supreme Court in Rainey supports the conclusion that otherwise 
inadmissible remainders have only limited admissibility. Indeed, when the Court held that 
???? ?????????? ??? ???? ???????????? ??????? ??????? ??ve been allowed, it stated that ???????
defendants would, of course, have been entitled to a limiting instruction pursuant to Rule 
???????????????????????????158 Under this reasoning, otherwise inadmissible remainders 
are not substantive evidence under Rule 106. 
Some may argue that limiting instructions are not entirely effective.159 However, 
jurors promise to follow instructions and there would be no purpose to providing them 
with instructions at all if the system did not trust them to keep their promise. In addition, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????160 ?????????????????????????????????????
closing arguments, neither attorney may ask the jury to draw those forbidden inferences 
??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????161
VI. CONCLUSION 
Rule 106 was adopted over four decades ago, and it has been a source of confusion 
and inconsistency ever since. The Supreme Court should resolve the split amongst the 
circuits by providing a clear interpretation of the meaning of Rule 106. The interpretation 
that follows purpose of the rules of evidence and general notions of fairness is that an 
opponent may introduce a remainder, even if the remainder is otherwise inadmissible. 
However, the remainder must be necessary to place the original part of the statement in 
context. In addition, there must be an indicia of reliability in order for self-serving 
exculpatory remainders to be introduced. Finally, the remainder should be admitted only 
for the limited purpose of context, and the jury should be instructed accordingly. This 
interpretation means that in practice, many remainders will not be introduced at trial. 
Sometimes fairness will require Rule 106 to act as a rule of incompleteness. 
Rule 106 is based on the concept of fairness in the presentation of evidence. 
However, no system in which the interpretation of the rule depends on the location of the 
court can possibly be fair. Indeed, inconsistency in this regard is the very definition of 
unfairness. It is time for the Supreme Court to eliminate this unfairness once and for all. 
                                                          
 158. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 158, 173 n.17 (1988). 
159. See Hardin, supra note 143, at 1288 (stating that ?it is unclear how effective limiting instructions are at 
preventing juries from using evidence for prohibited purposes?).
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing Daniel D. Blinka, Ethical Firewalls, Limited Admissibility, and Rule 703, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1229, 1236 (2007)). 
